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FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
REVISION OF DIVORCE DECREE IN Ex PARTE PROCEEDING
Oklahoma. The rule in the majority of American jurisdictions
seems to be that, once a decree of divorce has been made, the
court is without power to alter it unless authority is granted by
statute or reservation of such power is provided in the decree.'
In the absence of a reservation, it would appear that the statutory
requirements must be strictly fulfilled.
In Allen v. Alien' plaintiff (wife of defendant) brought action
on a written contract that was entered into by the litigants during
coverture in contemplation of the termination of the marital status.
The contract provided that defendant husband would pay to plain-
tiff $140 per month until remarriage or until her death. Defend-
ant complied with this provision of the contract from 1939 (at
which time a decree of divorce was granted the defendant against
the plaintiff in Nevada) until 1946. The present suit was predi-
cated on defendant's default touching the monthly installments.
Defendant countered that the wife had no rights under the con-
tract and that no action could be validly sustained. His defense
was based upon an ex parte proceeding without notice to the plain-
tiff wife in which the Nevada court, in an order nunc pro tunc,
modified the divorce judgment by the incorporation of the 1939
contract, copying it verbatim into the decree, thereby purporting
to extinguish the contract between the parties. Defendant in addi-
tion contended that full faith and credit must be given to the
divorce judgment as amended by the nunc pro tunc order of the
Nevada court.
The trial court denied plaintiff any relief, giving as its reason
the decree of the Nevada court as modified by the order nunc pro
tunc of 1946. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, with four jus-
12 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) 275.
2 - -- Okla.----_ 256 P. 2d 449 (1953).
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tices dissenting, vacated the judgment of the trial court, directing
that upon remand, judgment be entered for the plaintiff.
Only questions of law were presented on the appeal; no issues
of fact were raised by the pleadings. Many authorities from
diverse jurisdictions were cited upholding the plaintiff's position.
In essence, the noted cases held that where a property settlement
is copied into a divorce decree and made a part of it, the contract
is merged in the decree and no action is maintainable upon the
agreement. On the other hand, where the contract is simply
referred to with approval by the court rendering the decree (as in
the instant case), there is absence of merger and an action may
be maintained upon the contract.'
The pivotal question upon which the case turns is whether an
order nunc pro tunc, without notice to the adverse party, is valid.
The parties had stipulated that the law on this question was the
same in both states. The court found that the laws were in fact
parallel. A nunc pro tunc order made without notice to the adverse
party is void.'
Defendant's contention that full faith and credit must be
accorded the judgment of a sister state could not stand. A state
is required to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings
of a sister state only in the event that the court of the sister state
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons.' Plain-
tiff was not a party to the order nunc pro tunc.
CONTRACT FOR ALIMONY -ENFORCEABILITY
Texas. All but four American jurisdictions have enacted stat-
utes permitting alimony to the wife in absolute divorce cases.
Usually the alimony is an incident to the divorce, which is the
main relief sought. South Carolina does not grant divorces. In
8 Finley v. Finley, 65 Nev. 113, 189 P. 2d 334 (1948).
4 Lindsay v. Lindsay, 52 Nev. 26, 280 Pac. 95 (1929).
5 U. S. CONST. Art IV, § 1.
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Delaware the court may decree that part of the husband's prop-
erty be set aside to the wife. Texas permits the court to make
an equitable division of the spouses' property for the care of
the wife.6
In McBride v. McBride7 appellant sought modification of a
judgment against him. Specifically, he sought elimination of an
obligation to pay his divorced spouse a third of his monthly in-
come, but not to exceed $200 per month, until the appellee re-
married or until their son reached the age of twenty-one years.
The son at the time of the suit was four years of age, and the set-
tlement contract provided that appellee would receive the monthly
payment for her maintenance and support for approximately
seventeen years. The contract was "ratified and approved and . ..
made a part of . . . [the divorce] decree."
The court of appeals held:
This latter provision, which we hold to be in the nature of perma-
nent alimony, has no connection with, is not payable from and is not
referable to any property which either spouse may have owned or
claimed. Nor does it purport to be for the support, maintenance and
education of the son. It is by its own unmistakable language an agree-
ment to support and maintain a divorced wife from future earnings of
a divorced husband.
The point here is that if future wages of an ex-husband may be
subjected to the support of an ex-wife then the circuit has been com-
pleted and permanent alimony becomes an established reality despite
our statutes and many court decisions to the contrary.s
Appellee argued that the statutory bar of permanent alimony
was negatived by the voluntary nature of the agreement. The argu-
ment availed appellee nothing, since the court had no jurisdiction
and was without authority to grant permanent alimony.9 Consent
8 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) 260.
7 256 S. W. 2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
8 Id. at 253. The statutes referred to are TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts.
4636-4639.
9 Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S. W. 2d 46 (1931).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of the parties could not confer this character of jurisdiction upon
the court.' ° Contracts contrary to public policy are void and will
not be carried into effect by the courts." The public policy of the
State of Texas is disclosed by and embodied in the statutes re-
ferred to in the opinion.
The court refused to hold that future wages are property or
"estate of the parties" within the meaning of the statute authoriz-
ing division of property in divorce cases.'"
R. Clements.
10 Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S. W. 2d 598 (1943).
11 10 Ts~x. Jura., Contracts, § 109.
12 Tix. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4638: "The court pronouncing a decree
of divorce shall also decree and order a division of the estate of the parties in such a
way as the court shall deem just and right, having due regard to the rights of each party
and their children, if any. Nothing herein shall be construed to compel either party to
divest himself or herself of the title to real estate."
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